We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidity needs as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure (gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bank is insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking system to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure of one bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. We analyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification of the Too-big-to-fail-policy.
INTRODUCTION
The possibility of a systemic crisis affecting the major financial markets has raised regulatory concern all over the world. Whatever the origin of a financial crisis, it is the responsibility of the regulatory body to provide adequate fire walls for the crisis not to spill over other institutions. In this paper we explore the possibilities of contagion from one institution to another that can stem from the existence of a network of financial contracts. These contracts are essentially generated from three types of operations: the payments system, the interbank market and the market for derivatives. 1 Since these contracts are essential to the financial intermediaries' function of providing liquidity and risk sharing to their clients, the regulating authorities have to set patterns for Central Bank intervention when confronted with a systemic shock. In recent years, the 1987 stock market crash, the Saving and Loans crisis, the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises and the crisis of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund have all shown the importance of the intervention of the Central Banks and of the international financial institutions in affecting the extent, contagion, patterns and consequences of the crises. 2 In contrast to the importance of these issues, theory has not succeeded yet in providing a convenient framework to analyze systemic risk so as to derive how the interbank markets and the payments system should be structured and what the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) role should be.
A good illustration of the wedge between theory and reality is provided by the deposits shift that followed 1 There is ample empirical evidence on financial contagion. For a survey see de Bandt and Hartmann (1998) . Kaufman (1994) reviews empirical studies that measure the adverse effects on banks' equity returns of default of a major bank and of a sovereign borrower or unexpected increases in loan-loss provisions announced by major banks. Others have studied contagion through the flow of deposits (Saunders and Wilson 1996) , and using historical data (Gorton 1988 , Schoenmaker 1996 , and Calomiris and Mason 1997 . Whatever the methodology, these studies support the view that pure panic contagion is rare. Far more common is contagion through perceived correlations in bank asset returns (particularly among banks of similar size and/or geographical location).
2 A well known episode of near financial gridlock where a coordinating role was plaid by the Central Bank is represented by the series of events the day after the stock crash of 1987. Brimmer (1989 pp.14-15) writes that "On the morning of October 20, 1987, when stock and commodity markets opened, dozens of brokerage firms and their banks had extended credit on behalf of customers to meet margin calls, and they had not received balancing payments through the clearing and settlement systems. [...] As margin calls mounted, money center banks (especially those in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco) were faced with greatly increased demand for loans by securities firms. With an eye on their capital ratios and given their diminished taste for risk, a number of these banks became increasingly reluctant to lend, even to clearly creditworthy individual investors and brokerage firms. [...] To forestall a freeze in the clearing and settlement systems, Federal Reserve officials (particularly those from the Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) urged key money center banks to maintain and to expand loans to their creditworthy brokerage firm customers." the distress of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). In July 1991, the closure of BCCI in the UK made depositors with smaller banks switch their funds to the safe haven of the big banks, the so-called "flight to quality" (Reid 1991) . Theoretically this should not have had any effect, because big banks should have immediately lent again these funds in the interbank market and the small banks could have borrowed them. Yet the reality was different: the Bank of England had to step in, to encourage the large clearers to help those hit by the trend. Some packages had to be agreed (as the £200m. to the National Home Loans mortgage lender), thus supplementing the failing invisible hand of the market.
So far theory has not been able to explain why the intervention of the LOLR in this type of events was important.
Our motivation to analyze a model of systemic risk stems from both the lack of a theoretical set up, and the lack of consensus on the way the LOLR should intervene. In this paper we analyze interbank networks, focusing on possible liquidity shortages and on the coordinating role of the Financial Authorities -which we refer to as the Central Bank for short -in avoiding and solving them. To do so we construct a model of the payment flows that allows us to capture in a simple fashion the propagation of financial crises in an environment where both liquidity shocks and solvency shocks affect financial intermediaries that fund long term investments with demand deposits.
We introduce liquidity demand endogenously by assuming that depositors are uncertain about where they have to consume. This provides the need for a payments system or an interbank market. 3 In this way we extend the model of Freixas and Parigi (1998) to more than two banks, to different specifications of travel patterns and consumers' preferences. The focus of the two papers is different. Freixas and Parigi consider the trade-off between gross and net payments systems. In the current paper we concentrate instead on system-wide financial fragility and Central Bank policy issues. This paper is also related to Freeman (1996a,b) . In Freeman, demand for liquidity is driven by the mismatch between supply and demand of goods by spatially separated agents that want to consume the good of the other location, at different times. If agents' travel patterns are not perfectly synchronized, a centrally accessible institution (e.g. a clearing house) may arise to provide means of payments. This allows to clear the debt issued by 3 Payment needs arising from agents' spatial separation with limited commitment and default possibilities were first analyzed in Townsend (1987) . For the main theoretical issues related to systemic risk in payment systems see Berger, Hancock and Marquardt (1996) and Flannery (1996) , for an analysis of peer monitoring on the interbank market see Rochet and Tirole (1996) and for an analysis of the main institutional aspects see Summers (1994) . the agents to back their demand. In our paper, instead, liquidity demand arises from the strategies of agents with respect to the coordination of their actions.
Our main findings are, first, that, under normal conditions, a system of interbank credit lines reduces the cost of holding liquid assets. However, the combination of interbank credit and the payments system make the banking system prone to experience (speculative) gridlocks, even if all banks are solvent. If the depositors in one location wishing to consume in other locations believe that there will not be enough resources for their consumption at the location of destination, their best response is to withdraw their deposits at the home location. This triggers the early liquidation of the investment at the home location, which, by backward induction, makes it optimal for the depositors in other locations to do the same.
Second, the structure of financial flows affects the stability of the banking system with respect to solvency shocks. On the one hand, interbank connections enhance the "resiliency" of the system to withstand the insolvency of a particular bank, because a proportion of the losses on one bank's portfolio is transferred to other banks through the interbank agreements. On the other hand, this network of cross liabilities may allow an insolvent bank to continue operating through the implicit subsidy generated by the interbank credit lines, thus weakening the incentives to close inefficient banks.
Third, the Central Bank has a role to play as a "crisis manager". When all banks are solvent, the Central Banks's role to prevent a speculative gridlock is simply to act as a coordinating device. By guaranteeing the credit lines of all banks, the Central Bank eliminates any incentive for early liquidation. This entails no cost for the Central Bank since its guarantees are never used in equilibrium. When instead one bank is insolvent because of poor returns on its investment, the Central Bank has a role in the orderly closure of this bank. When a bank is to be liquidated, the Central Bank has to organize the bypass of this defaulting bank in the payment network and provide liquidity to the banks that depend on this defaulting bank.
Furthermore, since the interbank market may loosen market discipline, there is a role for supervision with the regulatory agency having the right to close down a bank even if this bank is not confronted with any liquidity problem.
Fourth, when depositors have asymmetric payments needs across space, the role of the locations where many depositors want to access their wealth (money center locations) becomes crucial for the stability of the entire banking system. We characterize the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) approach often followed by Central Banks in dealing with the financial distress of money center banks, i.e. banks occupying key positions in the interbank network system. The results of our paper are closely related to those of Allen and Gale (1998) where financial connections arise endogenously between banks located in different regions. In our work inter-regional financial connections arise because depositors face uncertainty about the location where they need to consume.
In Allen and Gale, instead, financial connections arise as a form of insurance: when liquidity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, cross holdings of deposits by banks redistribute the liquidity in the economy. These links, however, expose the system to the possibility that a small liquidity shock in one location spread to the rest of the economy. Despite the apparent similarities between the two models and the related conclusions pointing at the relevance of the structure of financial flows, it is worth noticing that in our paper instead we focus on the implications for the stability of the system when one bank may be insolvent. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up our basic model of an interbank network. In section 3 we describe the coordination problems that may arise even when all banks are solvent. In Section 4 we analyze the "resiliency" of the system when one bank is insolvent. In Section 5 we investigate whether the closure of one bank triggers the liquidation of others, and we show under which conditions the intervention of the Central Bank is needed to prevent a domino or contagion effect. Section 6 provides an example of asymmetric travel patterns and its implications for Central Bank intervention. Section 7 discusses the policy implications, offers some concluding remarks and points to possible extensions.
Basic Set Up
We consider an economy with 1 good and N locations with exactly one bank 4 in each location. There is a continuum of risk-neutral consumers of equal mass (normalized to one) in each location. There are three periods: t ¢ 0£ 1£ 2. The good can be either stored from one period to the next or invested¤ Each consumer is endowed with one unit of the good at t ¢ 0. Consumers cannot invest directly but must deposit their endowment in the bank of their location, which stores it or invests it for future consumption.
Consumption takes place at t ¢ 2 only. The storage technology yields the riskless interest rate which we normalize at 0¤ The investment of bank i yields a gross return R i at t Since we analyze interbank credit, the good should be interpreted as cash (i.e. Central Bank money).
Cash is a liability of the Central Bank that can be moved at no cost, but only by the Central Bank. 6 If we interpret our model in terms of payment systems the sequence of events takes place within a 24-hour period. Then we could interpret t 0 as the beginning of the day, t 1 as intraday, t 2 as overnight, and the liquidation cost 1 α as the cost of (fire) selling monetary instruments in an illiquid intraday market. 7 We assume that R i is publicly observable at t 1. In a multi-period version of our model, R i would be interpreted as a signal on bank i's solvency that could provoke withdrawals by depositors or liquidation by the central bank at t 1 (intraday). For simplicity, we adopt a two period model, and we assume here that the bank is liquidated anyway, either at t 1, or at t 2. Notice that even if R i is publicly observed at t 1 (we make this assumption to abstract from asymmetric information problems) it is not verifiable by a third party at t 1 (only ex-post, at t 2). Therefore the deposit contract cannot be fully conditioned on R i . More specifically, the amount c 1 received for a withdrawal at t 1 can just depend on the only verifiable information at t 1, namely the closure decision. We denote by D 0 this contractual amount 8 in the case where the bank is not closed at t 1. On the other hand, whenever the 5 The demandable deposit feature of the contract in this model does not rely necessarily on intertemporal insurance but may have alternative rationales. For example Calomiris and Kahn (1991) suggest that the right to withdraw on demand, accompanied by a sequential service constraint, gives informed depositors a credible threat in case of misuse of funds by the bank.
6 Models in the tradition of Diamond-Dybvig have typically left the characteristics of the one good in the economy in the mist. This is all right in a microeconomic set-up, but the model has monetary implications that lead to a different interpretation depending on the fact that the good is money or not. In particular, if the good is not money, but for example wheat, then Wallace (1988)'s criticism applies. In other words, if the good was interpreted as wheat we would have to justify why the Central Bank was endowed with a superior transportation technology. As we assume the good to be money, it is the fact that commercial banks use Central Bank money to settle their transactions that gives the Central Bank the monopoly of issuing cash. Therefore the possibility to transfer money from one location to another corresponds to the ability to create and destroy money. Notice, also that interpreting the good as cash implies that currency crises, which are often associated with systemic risk, are left out of our analysis. This is so because "cash" is then limited by the level of reserves of the Central Bank.
bank is closed (whether at t 1 or at t 2) its depositors equally share its assets (see Assumptions 1 and 2 below).
In order to be more explicit, it is worth examining the characteristics of the optimal deposit contract in the D-D model when the proportion of early diers tends to zero. This provides a useful benchmark for measuring the exposure of the interbank system to market discipline in our multi-bank model. Let When µ tends to zero, it is easy to see that c 2 tends to R Since R 1 and u is decreasing, we see immediately that D 0 R$ Therefore if the bank is known to be solvent no depositor has interest to withdraw unilaterally before he or she actually needs the money.
General formulation of consumption across space
Travel patterns, that is which depositor travels and to which location, are exogenously determined by nature at t 1 and privately revealed to each depositor. They result from depositors' payment needs arising from other aspects of their economic activities. For each depositor initially at location i, nature determines whether he or she travels and in which location j he or she will consume at t 2. 9 To consume at t 2 at location j i % j the travelers at location i can withdraw at t 1 and carry the cash by themselves from location i to location j. The implicit cost of transferring the cash across space is the foregone investment return. 10 This motivates the introduction of credit lines between banks to minimize as given. Notice that if R i was verifiable, D 0 could be contingent on it and the risk of contagion could be fully eliminated. 9 More generally, depositors receive shocks to their preferences which determine their demand for the good indexed by a particular location. 10 We could also add an explicit cost of "travelling with the cash" (i.e. bypassing the payments system). It would not affect our results. 
Assumption 2. If a bank is closed at time 1 its assets are shared between its own depositors only.
Assumption 2 simply means that when the bank is closed at time t & 1, only its depositors have a claim on its assets. Bank closure at time 1 may come from a decision of the regulator, or from the withdrawals of all depositors. Assumption 2 implies that when a bank is closed at time 1, it is deleted from the interbank network.
11 For a similar characterization of credit chains in the context of trading arrangements, see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) .
Let π i j be the measure of depositors from location i consuming at location j) where i can take any value including j, and let t i j be the proportion of travelers going from location i to j) j 12 For the sake of simplicity, unless otherwise specified (see Section 6), we will impose the following additional restrictions:
In this way we discard the supply and demand imbalances at a specific location as the cause of a disruption in the payments system or in the interbank market.
Because of the complexity of the transfers involved in an arbitrary matrix Π, we will illustrate our findings in two symptomatic cases: The structure of the payment flows in the credit chain interbank funding and in the diversified lending is very similar to that studied in Allen and Gale (1998). nisms, the interbank credit described above can be interpreted as a compensation scheme (net system) or a Real Time Gross System (RTGS) with multilateral credit lines.
Let us now introduce the players of the game, namely the N banks and their depositors. located at i and consuming at location j simultaneously and without coordination determines the fraction x i j of his or her deposit to maintain in the bank. Accordingly, the percentage of investment remaining at location j where he or she must consume is
Because of Assumption 1, the final consumption of depositors 
where the LHS (RHS) represents the assets (liabilities) of bank i, X i R i is the return on its investment, The optimal behavior of each depositor 
We establish the following notation: 
Any fixed point of this algorithm is greater than in the autarkic situation. This is because interbank credit lines allow each bank to keep a lower amount of liquid reserves and to invest more. However, the system is also more fragile. As we show in the next Sections, the non cooperative game played by depositors has other equilibria than
PURE COORDINATION PROBLEMS
We first analyze the equilibria of the game when all deposits are invested at t Notice, that banks do not play any strategic role: only depositors play strategically.
From the efficiency viewpoint, when all the banks are solvent the Credit Line Equilibrium dominates autarky which in turn dominates the Speculative Gridlock Equilibrium. 13 Hence there is a trade-off between a risky interbank market based on interbank credit and a safe payment mechanism which foregoes investment opportunities. 14 Both the Gridlock and the Credit Line Equilibria involve the use of credit lines. In both equilibria banks extend and honor credit lines up to the amount of their t q 2 resources. In the Speculative Gridlock Equilibrium it is not the banks that do not honor the credit lines, rather are the depositors that, by forcing the liquidation of the investment, reduce the amount of resources available at t q 2.
13 When α=1 the last two are equivalent. The cost of the Gridlock Equilibrium is proportional to 1-αr Notice that autarky is equivalent to a payment system with fully collateralized credit lines like TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer), the payment system designed to handle transactions in the Euro area.
There is a clear parallel between these two equilibria in our economy with N locations and the equilibria in a one-location D-D model. These results are also related to the papers by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) In this basic version of the model, in the event of a gridlock, every bank is solvent although illiquid. Thus no difficulty in distinguishing between insolvent and illiquid banks arises for the Central Bank. 15 The Central Bank has a simple coordinating role as a LOLR in guaranteeing private-sector credit lines or in providing fiat money, both backed by the authority of the Treasury to tax the return on the investment. 16 Similarly, by guaranteeing the value of deposits at the consumption locations, Deposit Insurance eliminates any incentive for the depositors to protect themselves by liquidating the investment, thus making it optimal for banks to extend credit to each other.
Like Deposit Insurance which is never used in equilibrium in the D-D model, the coordination role of the Central Bank costs no resources (excluding moral hazard issues), since in equilibrium it will not be necessary for the Central Bank to intervene. However, in a richer model credit line guarantees and Deposit Insurance would not have the same effect. In fact, unlike credit lines guarantees, Deposit
Insurance penalizes the managers of distressed banks, and might offer better incentives to managers to monitor each other. 15 For an analysis of this issue see the companion paper by Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (1998). 16 For example in the Canadian electronic system for the clearing and settlement of large value payments the Central Bank guarantees intraday credit lines (Freedman and Goodlet 1998).
In the next two Sections we tackle the issue of the impact of the insolvency of one bank on the rest of the system. In this Section we investigate under which conditions the losses of one bank can be absorbed by the other banks without provoking withdrawals by depositors, (this is what we call resiliency) and what are the implications in terms of market discipline. In the next Section we consider the issue of contagion.
That is we investigate whether the closure of an insolvent bank generates a chain reaction causing the liquidation of solvent banks.
In order to model the possibility of insolvency in a simple way, we make the extreme assumption that the return R i on the investment at location i can be either R
case it is efficient to liquidate it, absent contagion issues. For the remainder of this paper we assume that the probability of R u 0 is sufficiently low that it is optimal for the banks to invest all deposits at t u 0. 17
Returns are publicly observable at t u 1 but verifiable only at t u 2 so that no contract can be made contingent on these returns. Notice that by assumption 1 the public information that bank 1 is insolvent cannot be used the other banks to distinguish and discriminate the depositors of the insolvent bank. The efficient allocation of resources requires that banks be liquidated if and only if they are insolvent:
Whether this efficient closure rule is a Nash Equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between depositors, will depend on the structure of the interbank payment system. To illustrate this, we focus on the case in which one bank (say, bank 1) is insolvent, and we investigate under which conditions x 
We establish the following proposition: withdraw and withdrawals may not be confined to the insolvent bank, hence market discipline entails the cost of possibly excessive liquidation. We interpret γ as a measure of the exposure of the interbank system as a whole to market discipline when one bank is insolvent. 18 We now study how γ varies with λ (the proportion of travelers) and N (the number of locations) in the two cases of credit chain and diversified lending. Proposition 4.2 Both in the credit chain case and in the diversified lending case, γ increases with λ and N; i.e. when the proportion of travelers increases or the number of banks increases, the system becomes less exposed to market discipline.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the number of banks increases, the insolvency of one bank has a lower impact on the value of the deposits in the other banks. Similarly an increase in the fraction of travelers spreads on the other banks a larger fraction of the loss due to the insolvency of one bank. This seems quite intuitive for the diversified lending case, since the banks hold more diversified portfolios of loans. The novelty is that this result holds true also for the credit chain case where banks have the possibility to pass part of their losses to other banks through the interbank market.
We now compare the two systems for given values of λ and N. We then compare the exposure to market discipline of the credit chain and the diversified lending structures.
Proposition 4.3
In case of the insolvency of one bank, the system is more exposed to market discipline under diversified lending than under credit chains; i.e. γ CRE
Proposition 4.3 may appear counterintutive since diversification is usually associated with the ability to spread losses. The result depends on the proportion of the losses on its own portfolio that the insolvent bank is able to transfer to other banks through the payments system. In a diversified lending system there is more diversification so that solvent banks exchange a larger fraction of their claims. As a consequence in a diversified lending system the insolvent bank is able to pass over to the solvent banks a smaller fraction of its losses.
The case with three banks Consider now the case of credit chains. Still assuming λ n 1, the balance sheet equations give:
We can compute the losses experienced by each bank (with respect to the promised returns R) and it is a simple exercise to check that the only solution is:
Therefore, bank 1 is able to pass on a higher share of its losses than in the diversified lending case, which explains the lower exposure of the interbank system to market discipline in the credit chain system.
The results of this Section highlight another side of interbank markets in addition to their role in redistributing liquidity efficiently studied by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) . Interbank connections enhance the "resiliency" of the system to withstand the insolvency of a particular bank. However, this network of cross liabilities may loosen market discipline and allow an insolvent bank to continue operating through the implicit subsidy generated by the interbank credit lines. This loosening of market discipline is the rationale for a more active role for monitoring and supervision with the regulatory agency having the right to close down a bank in spite of the absence of any liquidity crisis at that bank.
The effect of a Central Bank's guarantee on interbank credit lines would be that x n v 1t u u u t 1o is always an equilibrium, even if one bank is insolvent. The stability of the banking system would be preserved at the cost of forbearance of inefficient banks.
Efficiency vs. Contagion Risk
We now turn to the other side of the relationship between efficiency and stability of the banking system, and investigate under which conditions the closure at time t to suppress all that concerns bank k from the equations 5 . We obtain:
where
We now have to check whether x i j 1 for all iy j w ky can correspond to an equilibrium. In this case, 
Since by assumption R i R for all i k,
This allows us to establish a result analogous to Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 5.1 (Contagion Risk) There is a critical value of the smallest time t 2 deposits below which the closure of a bank causes the liquidation of at least another bank. This critical value is lower in the credit chain case than in the diversified lending case. The diversified lending structure is always stable when the number N of banks is large enough whereas N has no impact on the stability of the credit chain structure.
Proof. It follows the same structure of the proof of Proposition 4.1. Denoting by M k the inverse of the matrix defined by system 16 , stability is equivalent to:
One can see that all the elements of M k are non negative 19 , thus stability obtains iff 19 The fact that the matrix M k has non negative elements follows from a property of diagonal dominant matrices (See e.g.
Takayama 1985 p.385).
Ψ cre
in the credit chain example, and in the diversified lending case, respectively. It is immediate from these formulas that Ψ cre <Ψ div (for N © 2) and that Ψ div tends to 1 when N tends to infinity while Ψ cre is independent of N.
Comparison with Allen and Gale (1998)
It is useful to compare our results with those of Allen and Gale (1998) . Proposition 4.1 establishes that systemic crises may arise for fundamental reasons, like in Allen and Gale. However, the focus of the two papers is different. Allen and Gale are concerned with the stability of the system with respect to liquidity shocks arising from the random number of consumers that need liquidity early in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. They show that the system is less stable when the interbank market is incomplete (in the sense that banks are allowed to cross hold deposits only in a credit chain fashion) than when the interbank market is complete (in the sense that banks are allowed to cross hold deposits in a diversified lending fashion).
In our paper interbank links arise, instead, from consumers geographic uncertainty and the focus is on the implications of the insolvency of one bank in terms of market discipline and stability of the system.
In particular in Proposition 4.3 we show how the structure of interbank links allows to spread over other banks the losses of one bank. We show that a diversified lending system is more exposed to market discipline (i.e. less resilient) than a credit chain system because in the latter the insolvent bank is able to transfer a larger fraction of its losses to other banks thus reducing the incentives for its own depositors to withdraw. In Proposition 5.1 we are concerned with the stability of the system with respect to contagion risk triggered by the efficient liquidation at time t 21 The Barings' failure of 1996 is an example of the crisis of a large financial institution that did not create systemic risk. 22 Notice that we now abandon Assumption 3 (the symmetry assumption).
Proof. To prove (i) notice that if bank 1 is closed then X 1 ½ 0, and
To prove (ii) notice that if bank 2 is closed then
1À is an equilibrium the balance sheet equations become, when
1Å 0Å 1À is an equilibrium whenever
Our last result concerns the optimal attitude of the Central Bank when the money center bank becomes
R is large, the Central Bank has to inject liquidity. More precisely we have:
R is sufficiently low (no Central Bank intervention is needed). In the other case, the cost of bailout increases with
Solving ¾ 22À and (6.2) when R 1
The cost of bailout is 0 iff
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have constructed a model of the banking system where liquidity needs arise from consumers' uncertainty about where they need to consume. Our basic insight is that the interbank market allows to minimize the amount of resources held in low-return liquid assets. However, interbank links expose the system to the possibility that a number of inefficient outcomes arise: the excessive liquidation of productive investment as a result of coordination failures among depositors; the reduced incentive to liquidate insolvent banks because of the implicit subsidies offered by the payments networks; the inefficient liquidation of solvent banks because of the contagion effect stemming from one insolvent bank.
Policy implications
We use this rich set-up to derive a number of policy implications (summarized in Table 1 ) with respect to the interventions of the Central Bank.
First, the interbank market may not yield the efficient allocation of resources because of possible coordination failures that may generate a "gridlock" equilibrium. The Central Bank has thus a natural coordination role to play which consists of implicitly guaranteeing the access to liquidity of individual banks. If the banking system as a whole is solvent the costs of this intervention is negligible and its distortionary effects may stem only from moral hazard issues (Proposition 3.1). Given the interbank links, the closure of an insolvent bank must be accompanied by the provision of Central Bank liquidity to the counterparts of the closed bank. 23 This is what we called orderly closure.
Assuming that this is possible, theoretically it entails no costs apart from moral hazard. However, the orderly closure might simply not be feasible for money center banks (Proposition 6.1) in which case 23 For instance, in the credit chain case, if bank k is closed the Central Bank can borrow from bank k Ð 1 and lend to bank k Ñ 1, thus allowing the interbank arrangements to function smoothly.
-25 -the Central Bank has no choice but to bailout the insolvent institution, with the obvious moral hazard implications of the TBTF policy.
Our model can be extended in various directions some of which are discussed below.
Imperfect Information on Banks' Returns
In reality, both the Central Bank and the depositors have only imperfect signals on the solvency of commercial banks (although the Central Bank' signals are hopefully more precise). Therefore, the Central Bank will have to act knowing that with some probability it will be lending to (guaranteeing the credit lines of) insolvent institutions and with some probability it will be denying credit to solvent institutions.
Also, depositors may run on all the banks which have generated a bad signal.
The consequences are different depending on the structure of the interbank market. In the credit chain case, the Central Bank will have to intervene to provide credit with a higher probability than in the diversified lending case. Therefore in the credit chain case the Central Bank has a higher probability of ending up financing insolvent banks. Ex ante, therefore, the Central Bank intervention is much more expensive in the credit chain case, so that in this case a fully collateralized payments system may be preferred.
Payments among different countries
Systemic risk is often related to the spreading of financial crisis from one country to another. Our basic model can be extended to consider various countries instead of locations within the same country. When depositors belong to different countries, travel patterns that generate a consumption need in another location have the natural interpretation of demand of goods of other countries, i.e. import demand. 
It is easy to see that γ CRE N increases in N and in θ (and therefore in γ). Notice that γ CRE ∞
